

ART. VII.—*Christian Life and Doctrine*. By the Rev. W. CUNNINGHAM, D. D., Principal of the Free Church College, Edinburgh. 1859.

*Ueber den unterscheidenden Charakter des Christenthums, mit Beziehung auf neuere Auffassungsweise*. Von C. ULLMANN, Professor an der Universität zu Heidelberg. 1845.

*The Doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, in its Relation to Mankind and the Church*. By ROBERT ISAAC WILBERFORCE, A. M., Archdeacon of the East Riding. First American from the second London edition. Philadelphia: H. Hooker & Co. 1849, pp. 411.

IN his lecture at the opening of the recent session of the Free Church College in Edinburgh, Dr. Cunningham chose as his subject the nature of Christianity. It might seem that in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, it was rather late to discuss that question. There is, however, very little that is stable in human thought. The questions which now agitate the church are those about which Athanasius and Augustine contended, in their respective ages. Every man and every age have to determine anew for themselves all really life questions. We cannot take our faith by inheritance, if it be really ours. We are under the necessity of thinking it out for ourselves, and incorporating it into our own consciousness. The same general problems are constantly presented under new conditions, and must be perpetually rediscussed. The question, therefore, What is Christianity? although the same which engaged the earnest inquiries of our predecessors, comes up before the minds of this generation in a new form, and complicated with new modes of thought. In discussing this subject Dr. Cunningham says there are "two notions which seem to pass very much current in the present day as received maxims, but which, I think, can easily be shown to be specimens of real one-sidedness, and at the same time to be fitted, when believed and acted on, to exert an injurious influence

on theological study." These notions are, "First, that Christianity is not a doctrine, but a life; and, second, that the proper object of true faith is not a proposition, but a person." With his characteristic discrimination and force, the writer proceeds to show that these are indeed one-sided notions, that Christianity is both a doctrine and a life, and that the object of true faith is both a proposition and a person. It is not what the foregoing notions affirm, but what they deny, that is to be objected to. It is true that Christianity is a life, but it is untrue that it is not a doctrine. It is true that Christ as a person is the object of faith, but it is untrue that the proposition, "Jesus is the Son of God," and others of like kind, are not the objects of faith. All language is either ambiguous or inadequate, and hence all controversy degenerates into logomachy, unless we understand each other as to the use of terms. Christianity objectively considered, is the testimony of God concerning his Son, it is the whole revelation of truth contained in the Scriptures, concerning the redemption of man through Jesus Christ our Lord. Subjectively considered, it is the life of Christ in the soul, or, that form of spiritual life which has its origin in Christ, is determined by the revelation concerning his person and work, and which is due to the indwelling of his Spirit. In one sense, therefore, we may affirm that Christianity is a doctrine, and in another sense we may with equal truth affirm that Christianity is a life. This subject, however, is not to be disposed of in this summary way. What is meant by those who in our day assert that Christianity is a life? They answer by saying, "The life of Christ is Christianity." If we ask, What is meant by the life of Christ? the answer is, "It is Divinity united to our humanity." In consequence of this union, the divine and human are made one. "Christ's life is one." His Divinity, soul and body, are united in one life. Wherever, therefore, this life is, there are Christ's soul, body, and Divinity. If we inquire how this life of Christ is Christianity, we are told that the law of life is development; that Divinity and humanity united in Christ as a truly human life, is a germ which unfolds itself in the way of history, and constitutes the church. God became incarnate not in a man, but in humanity. In the church God



is still manifest in the flesh. That is to say, "Christ's life as a whole, (i. e. including his Divinity, soul, and body,) is borne over into the person of the believer as a whole," so that each individual believer and the faithful as an organic whole (the church,) are the dwelling place of this theanthropic life. The church is the form in which this life of Christ projects itself in space, and unfolds itself in history. The church, therefore, is theanthropic as truly as Christ himself was. The only difference is, that in him the Divinity is immediately united with humanity, whereas in us the union is mediate. That is, the Logos does not dwell in us personally and individually, but he dwells in that nature which comes to personality in the believer. Our connection, therefore, is with the human life of Christ, but in that life the Divinity enters and combines as one life. The church, therefore, in which God is incarnate has supernatural powers, and her sacraments are "the bearers of the Divine-Human life of the Redeemer," "divinely instituted for the purpose of bringing this theanthropic life into real contact with our nature." Vastly more, therefore, is meant by saying that Christianity is a life than strikes the ear. The words are few and simple, but they contain a whole system of Anthropology, Christology, Soterology, and Ecclesiology.

As the system above referred to has been adopted by men of the highest eminence, not only in Germany, the land of its birth, but also in England and America, as it has exerted a very extensive and powerful influence on the whole department of modern theological literature, doctrinal and practical, and as it has worked its way even into the popular mind so that its formulas and phrases are constantly reappearing, even in quarters where its principles are either not understood or not adopted, it is entitled to serious attention. Its advocates claim for it absolute truth. All other views of Christianity are represented as behind the age, and treated with contempt. We propose a brief exposition of this system that our readers may know the answer given to the question, What is Christianity? by many of the leading minds of the present day. We are aware that we have undertaken a very difficult task which we have little hope of accomplishing to the satisfac-

tion of the advocates of the system itself. This difficulty is manifold. It arises partly out of the fact that the subjects involved are in their nature the most profound which can engage the human mind—the nature of man, the nature of God, his relation to the world, the constitution of Christ's person, his union with his people with all its consequences here and hereafter. Besides this, every theology is in one sense a form of philosophy. To understand any theological system, therefore, we must understand the philosophy which underlies it, and gives it its peculiar form. But the philosophy of which this system is the expression is almost entirely foreign to the ordinary modes of thought among Americans and Englishmen. It is, therefore, not to be expected that it should be thoroughly understood or appreciated without much previous training. Then again, the system itself is presented by its adherents in very different forms. The general school of Schleiermacher has been split into numerous divisions, all of which depart more or less from the great master whose authority they recognize. One man, therefore, is not responsible for the teachings of another. The substratum of Schleiermacher's system was *Pantheism*, yet most if not all his disciples are avowed Theists. Such being the difficulties which surround this subject, we shall not be so bold as to attempt any philosophical account of the genesis of the system. We shall not attempt an exposition of the philosophical principles to which it owes its character, but content ourselves with presenting in a concrete form the doctrines to which those principles have led.

It may be proper before entering on this exposition to remark that this system is new. It does not pretend to be in harmony with the church doctrines, whether Romish or Protestant. Ullmann, one of its most amiable and effective advocates says, indeed it is "*Nicht etwas schlechthin Neues*," (*not out and out new*.) "We find it," he says, "in another form in ancient mysticism, especially in the German mystics of the middle ages. With them too, the ground and central point of Christianity is the oneness of Deity and humanity effected through the incarnation of God and deification of man." P. 59. The Mystics, he adds, ignored the sinfulness of men, and the necessity of redemption. At the Reformation, the conviction



of sin and a sense of the need of a Redeemer, determined the form in which Christianity was conceived and presented. The Reformers, however, looked too much to the work of Christ, and too little at the constitution of his person. They did not recognize the fact that it was the perfect unity of Divinity and humanity in him which made him not only the Redeemer, but the ideal man, the model and type of manhood. We must, therefore, go back to the German Mystics of the middle ages, according to Dr. Ullmann, to find the generic idea of this modern conception of Christianity. That idea is, as Dr. Ullmann states, the oneness of God and man, of Divinity and humanity. Another admitted fact is that this system is the product of the German pantheistic philosophy. The results, says Ullmann, which were reached by the Mystics under the guiding impulse of religious feeling, have in our days been attained in the way of speculation, thought and reflection. The unity of the divine and human, of God and man, is the conclusion at which modern speculation in the hands of Hegel and Schelling has arrived. This, too, is the central truth of Christianity: Hegel therefore said that "Christianity is the absolute truth of religion." It was on this ground, that he endeavoured to reconcile Christianity with philosophy, that is, with pantheism. This, however, was but a sham alliance. What Christianity asserts of Christ, the perfect union of the divine and human in his person, Hegel, in another form, asserted of the race. It is the nature of God to become man, and of man to recognize himself as God. The absolute spirit comes to existence, consciousness and self-manifestation in the race of men, and they return to God. This is not the uniting of two different principles in one life, but it is only the manifestation of an original and eternal oneness, in virtue of which men at a certain stage of their development come to the knowledge that they are God. P. 37. This view of the matter is utterly destructive of the true idea of God and of man. It is the worst form of Atheism, for it is the deification of man—besides it acknowledges no God. The doctrine of Schelling and Hegel, therefore, was soon recognized both by its advocates and opponents as irreconcilable with Christianity. Nevertheless their philosophy was regarded as a great advance. Its

great principle of the union of the divine and human, not merely in an individual, but in the race, was in some form to be retained. *The Mercersburgh Review*, January 1851; pp. 57, 58, acknowledges the intimate relation between the speculative philosophy and this theological system, and represents "the christological ideas" of Hegel especially, as "very significant and full of instruction." "If we are bound," says the Reviewer, "to allow this much even to Hegel, who will pretend that a still greater regard is not due to the professedly Christian speculations of Schleiermacher and others following more or less his theological influence, as occupied with the same profound and deeply interesting themes?" Schleiermacher, whose philosophy was scarcely less avowedly pantheistic than that of Spinoza or of Hegel, had a profound devotional spirit, which he retained from his Moravian training. He proposed therefore to divorce theology from philosophy, to allow the latter full swing in her own sphere, and to construct a theological system out of the religious consciousness alone. This, from the nature of the case, was an impossibility. No such divorce is possible, and in no system is the union of these elements more apparent and pervading than in Schleiermacher's own. The attempt, however, has had far reaching consequences. It served to present, in a Christian garb and under orthodox names, many philosophical ideas which could not otherwise have made their way into the church. Even in his theology, Schleiermacher, in the judgment of one-half of Germany, is pantheistic in his doctrine concerning God and his relation to the world, and in the judgment we presume of all parties his doctrine concerning sin is not essentially different from that of Schelling and Hegel. See *Martensen's Dogmatik*, p. 188. The great problem with Schleiermacher's more orthodox successors has been to bring the main idea of the modern philosophy, the union "of the divine and human fully as one life," into harmony with Theism and the gospel. This has given rise to that system of which we are now speaking, and has led to the modification of all the great doctrines of the Bible.

I. As to anthropology. The doctrine concerning the nature of man which underlies the common theology of the church is, that he consists of two distinct subjects or sub-



stances, the soul and body, associated in an intimate life-union in the same person, but capable of separate existence, and as regards the soul, susceptible of continued consciousness and activity in a disembodied state. The common doctrine also supposes that the soul is a distinct subsistence, a substance constituting an individual being. It is evident that these views of the nature of man which seem to be everywhere assumed in the Bible, must determine in large measure the view taken of our relation to Adam, of the nature of original sin, of the constitution of Christ's person, and of other important doctrines of the Scriptures. If Christ took upon him our nature, we cannot agree as to what he assumed, unless we are agreed as to what human nature is. In the modern mystical system, the old doctrine concerning man is repudiated. That system denies the essential dualism between the soul and body, and it represents humanity as a generic life. As to the former of these points, Schleiermacher in his *Dialektik*, pp. 245—255, says: "There is not a corporeal and spiritual world, a corporeal and spiritual existence of man. Such representations lead to nothing but the dead mechanism of a pre-established harmony. Body and spirit are actual only in and with each other, so that corporeal and spiritual action can only be relatively distinguished."\* The late President Rauch says of the theory which admits of two substances in the constitution of man, that "it supposes the body has a life of its own, and the soul likewise; both are however intended for each other, and the former receives the latter as the engine the steam. . . . A dualism which admits of two principles for *one* being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is, that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third. A river may originate in two fountains, but a science cannot, and much less individual life."† Soul and body are only a two-fold expression of the same energy. "It would be wrong to say that man consists of two essentially different substances of earth and soul; but he is *soul only*, and cannot be anything else. This soul however unfolds itself externally in the *life* of the body, and internally in the *life* of the mind." "The soul has no real existence without the body, which is as necessary to

\* Thomsen.

† Rauch's *Psychology*, pp. 180, 184.

it as the sheet of rain is for the rainbow." Olshausen in his *Commentary*, 1 Cor. xix. 20, denies that (*die Seele für sich subsistirend zu denken ist*,) the soul subsists of itself. Dr. J. W. Nevin says that "commonly the idea of human life is split for the imagination into two lives, and a veritable dualism thus constituted in our nature, in place of the veritable unity that belongs to it in fact." "This," he adds, "is as false to all true philosophy, as it is unsound in theology and pernicious for the Christian life. Soul and body in their ground are but one life; identical in origin; bound together by mutual interpenetration subsequently at every point; and holding for ever in the presence of the self-same organic law. We have no right to think of the body as a form of existence of and by itself, into which the soul as another form of such existence is thrust in a mechanical way. Both form *one* life. The soul to be complete, to develop itself as soul, *must* externalize itself, throw itself out in space, and this externalization is the body. All is one process, the action of one and the same living organic principle, dividing itself only that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete."\* It may be here remarked in passing, that if the soul and body are thus one life, mutually dependent and inseparable, if the soul externalizes itself in the body, we can well understand how God, according to the same mode of philosophizing, may externalize himself in the world, and God and world be thus mutually dependent, the different forms of one and the same life, "dividing itself that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete." Schleiermacher accordingly taught, that although God and the world are distinguished in thought, they are in fact "nothing but two values for the same postulate (*zwei Werthe für dieselbe Forderung*.)"† He says it is vain to attempt to conceive of God as existing either before or out of the world, just as Olshausen, Nevin, and others teach, that it is vain to conceive of the soul as existing without the body. *Ohne Leib keine Seele*, (no body, no soul) and "no world, no God," are propositions very nearly allied, and are inseparable at least in Schleiermacher's system.

What then is man according to the mystical system? The

\* *Mystical Presence*, p. 171.† *Dialektik*, p. 433.



answer to this question is by no means uniform. Schleiermacher himself says, "Der mensch an sich ist das Erkennen der Erde in seinem ewigen Seyn, und in seinem immer wechselnden Werden: oder der Geist, der nach Art und Weise unserer Erde zum Selbstbewusstseyn sich gestaltet."\* *Man as such is the recognition of the earth in its eternal existence, and in its perpetually changing development: or God (der Geist) in the form in which he comes to self-consciousness on our earth.*" If this definition had been adhered to by his followers everything would be plain. But it is so obviously pantheistic in its origin and bearing, that the theistic portion of his disciples have modified it in various ways. In the *Mercersburgh Review* for November, 1850, p. 550, we are told that "the world in its lower view is not simply the outward theatre or stage on which man is to act his part as a candidate for heaven. In the midst of its different forms of existence, it is pervaded throughout with the power of a single life; which comes ultimately to its full sense and force only in the human person." To the same effect in the number for January, 1850, p. 7, it is said: "The world is an organic whole which completes itself in man; and humanity is regarded throughout as a single grand fact which is brought to pass, not at once, but in the way of history, unfolding always more its true interior sense, and reaching onward towards its final consummation." According to this view, man is only one form in which "the power of a single life" pervading the world reveals and completes itself. It is hard to see wherein this differs from the previous statement. The two become identical by substituting (der Geist) God, for "the power of a single life." And that substitution would make little change in the meaning of either, as both seem to proceed on the assumption of "the essential oneness of God and man," which is the admitted groundwork of Schleiermacher's system.†

\* Dorner's *Christologie*, (first edition,) p. 488.

† Schleiermacher distinguishes between two kinds of Pantheism. The one he denounces as a mere "masked materialistic negation of Theism;" the other, which retains the formula "one call," still makes God and the world at least as to their functions different. This latter form he maintains is perfectly consistent with the highest state of the religious feeling. The religion of such a Pantheist, he says, differs little from that of many Monotheists. B. i. p. 54.

The more common mode of statement among the avowed theists of this school is, that humanity is a generic life, revealing itself in a multitude of personalities. The *Mercersburgh Review*, November, 1859, says: "Personality unites in itself the presence of a spiritual universal life, which is strictly and truly the fountain of its own activity in the form of intelligence and will, and a material organization as a necessary medium and basis of its revelation." P. 559. Take away her material organization (the body,) and you have only "this spiritual universal life," which, however, has no active existence in and of itself, that is, apart from the material organization by which it is revealed, any more than vegetable life has active existence out of vegetable organism. "The human race," says Dr. Nevin, "is not a sand heap. It is the power of a single life. It is bound together not outwardly but inwardly. Men have been one before they have been many, and as many they are still one." *Mystical Presence*, p. 161. Archdeacon Wilberforce, who is endorsed by Dr. Nevin as a true representative of the system in all its main features,\* insists much on this point. From page 41 to page 57 of his work on the Incarnation he labours to prove the reality of human nature as a generic whole, of which individual men are the partakers and manifestations. Of this generic nature it is taught, 1. That it has "a real objective existence." "It would be vicious nominalism," says Archdeacon Wilberforce, "to deny an objective reality, where an inherent law prevents the possibility of re-arrangement, and confines individuals to the peculiar classes to which they severally belong." P. 49. This generic nature is declared to be an "entity." Dr. Nevin calls it "a substance." "Such a collective existence," he says, "in the case of our race, not the aggregate of its individual lives, but the underlying substance

\* *Mercersburgh Review*, March, 1850. Ullmann's *Treatise on the Nature of Christianity*, originally published in the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1845, is translated and attached as a "Preliminary Essay to Dr. Nevin's work on the Mystical Presence. The principles of that Essay are developed in Dr. Nevin's book with more clearness and thoroughness than by Ullmann himself. And the principles of Wilberforce on the Incarnation "agree substantially," says Dr. Nevin, "with views presented in our own book." All these works are reproductions of the Schleiermacher school of theology.



in which all these are one, is everywhere assumed in the Bible as a fact entering into the whole history of religion."\* 2. It is not only a substance, a real objective entity, but it is declared to be a life, a life power, the real source of all the activity, "of intelligence and will," as well as of the physical organism in individual men. 3. Everything, therefore, that ever comes to actual existence in the individual lies potentially in this generic life. Everything that is in the oak was potentially in the acorn, and nothing can be in the oak that was not in the life of the germ. 4. This generic human nature as a life is of course subject to all the laws of life. It is governed by fixed laws. It remains immutably the same. Vegetable life cannot pass into animal life, nor the form of life peculiar to one animal pass into that which belongs to another. Like uniformly begets like. It is subject also to organic development. "It is a universal property of life to unfold itself from within, by a self-organizing power, towards a certain end, which end is its own realization, or in other words, the actual exhibition and actualization in outward form of all the elements, functions, powers, and capacities which potentially it includes. Thus life may be said to be all at its commencement which it can become in the end." 5. Partly from this view of humanity as a generic life unfolding itself from within, containing potentially in itself all that can become actual in its manifestation, and partly from the primary idea of the whole system, viz. the essential unity of God and man, it would seem to follow that humanity in its process of development must come at last to the conscious union of the divine and human in one life; that this is involved in the very idea of humanity, so that Christ as God-man is the ideal man, our nature reaching in him the state potentially involved in its original constitution. The incarnation, therefore, is not a grand supernatural interposition for the redemption of man from sin. It is the necessary result of the law of humanity itself, and would have occurred though sin had never entered the world. This is the avowed doctrine of some of the advocates of this general theory. Dr. Liebner of Göttingen, in his Christology, carries

\* *Mercersburgh Review*, March 1850, p. 177.

out this idea to its full extent. Dr. Nevin teaches, in less explicit terms, but in our apprehension no less clearly, the same doctrine. In his review of Dr. Liebner's work in the *Mercersburgh Review*, January 1851, he says, "That must be a false and mutilated view of the nature and history of man, which rests not on a firm apprehension of his true relationship to God, as this comes out ultimately in the constitution of the Messiah. That must ever be a false and defective view of the nature of God as related to the world, which stops short of the theanthropy, as the true and necessary central sun that serves to irradiate and complete all other revelations by which he is known." P. 56. There is not a word of objection to Liebner's doctrine which it is the design of the review to unfold. All that is said is on the side of defence. The objection of Thomäsius, one of the first and most mystical of the modern Lutheran theologians in Germany, that the system is essentially pantheistical, Dr. Nevin pronounces, in his usual authoritative way, "a mere sound without any force whatever." He says, we need "a truly Christian pantheism" to oppose to the anti-christian pantheism of the day. Pantheism, however, is pantheism, whether baptized Christian or antichristian. It is not, however, only in that particular article that this idea is advanced. It is involved in his whole system as developed in his "Mystical Presence." "Humanity," says Dr. Nevin, "is never complete till it reaches his [Christ's] person. It includes in its very constitution a struggle towards the form in which it is here exhibited, which can never rest until this end is attained. Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The *idea* which it embodies can never be fully actualized under any other form. The incarnation then is the proper completion of humanity. Christ is the true ideal Man. Here is reached ultimately the highest summit of human life, which is of course the crowning sense of the world, or that in which it finds its last and full signification." "History, like nature, is one vast prophecy of the incarnation, from beginning to end. How could it be otherwise, if the idea of humanity, as we have seen, required from the first such an union with the divine nature in



order that it might be complete? What is history but the process by which this idea is carried forward according to the immanent law of its own nature, in the way of a regular development towards its appointed end?" Pp. 200, 201. Nothing can be more explicit than this. Humanity includes in its original constitution the idea of that union with God which is found in the person of Christ, and it reaches that end according to a law immanent in its own nature, by a regular process of historical development. We are not surprised, therefore, to be told on page 174 that Christ's "divine nature is at the same time human in the fullest sense." In man there is self-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of self; world-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of the world; and God-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of God. Schleiermacher over and over says, that the only difference between Christ and other men was that the *Gottesbewusstseyn*, (God-consciousness) which he represents as a real *Seyn Gottes* (existence of God) determined in him all his activity from beginning to end. Thus he was the ideal man, that is, the man in whom the true idea of humanity was realized. But as Christ was God manifest in the flesh, the true idea of humanity must be the unity of divinity and humanity in one life, or God in the fashion of a man. "The *Grundbestimmung* (the fundamental idea) of Christianity," says Uhlmann, "is the oneness of Christ and God, but therewith connected the equally original certainty that this oneness is not to remain individual, isolated, transient, but passes over with the Spirit and life of Christ to believers, and gradually to mankind."\* Humanity reaches its culminating point of essential unity with God, first in Christ, and then through him in his people. The object of the whole system is to find some middle ground between pantheism and dualism, that is, between the doctrine that God and the world are one, and the doctrine that they are two. This middle ground must be narrower than a hair, rather too narrow for the foundation of a stupendous structure of Christian doctrine. It is a wonderful hallucination of self-conceit which leads these builders to condemn as rationalists, and, worse yet, as Puritans, those who will not trust their souls to their cobweb edifice.

\* *Studien und Kritiken*, 1845, p. 40.

Such then is the anthropology of the mystical system.\* It denies any real dualism in the constitution of man. He is soul, and soul only, revealing itself outwardly in the body, and inwardly in mental activity. A man is not an individual subsistence, but the revelation of a generic life in connection with a particular external organism. And in virtue of the essential unity of Divinity and humanity, the latter by a process of organic development arrives at last to a conscious oneness with God. This view of man's nature is made consciously and avowedly to determine the whole scheme of Christian doctrine. It determines the nature of our relation to Adam, and of original sin. It decides all questions concerning the constitution of Christ's person. It determines the nature of redemption, and the mode in which believers are made partakers of its benefits. And it involves also the decision of every important question concerning the nature of the church, and the design and efficacy of the sacraments. Our immediate object, however, is to expound the teachings of this system in reference to the present state of man.

Those of its advocates who retain sufficient reverence for the Scriptures, (which was not the fact with Schleiermacher,) to feel bound to attempt a conciliation between their doctrine and the admitted facts of the Bible, apply their anthropology to explain our connection with Adam, and the nature of original sin. As humanity is a generic life, Adam was not merely *a* man but *the* man. He was humanity itself; its original germ and fountain-head. His act, therefore, was not the act of *a* man, but of humanity. That generic life, including intelligence and will which afterwards was developed in a multitude of personalities, then existed solely in his per-

\* We have felt no little embarrassment in determining on a suitable designation for the system under consideration. It might be called "The Schleiermacher System," from its acknowledged author, but that designation is too restricted, considering the numerous and important modifications the theory has undergone since it left his hands. It might be characterized as *Transcendental*, but that term is vague and indeterminate. The word *mystical* has much to recommend it. It is inoffensive. It refers to the remote genesis of the system as connected with the mysticism of the middle ages, and it is occasionally employed by the advocates of the system themselves. At any rate it serves to distinguish it from the common doctrine.



son, and acted in and by him. Adam's sin was, therefore, strictly and properly, and not merely representatively or by imputation, the sin of the race. The intelligence and will which comes to self-consciousness in the successive generations of men, were the agents of that sin in the person of Adam. The only sense, therefore, in which that sin is imputed to us, is that it is strictly and properly our own act, not of our persons but of our nature, of that generic life which we have in common with Adam, and which is as much ours as it was his. "In him was comprehended in its generic form a general life, which was to develop itself by the course of natural generation to the end of time. As such he was called upon to say in the name of the general life which he embodied, whether or not he would take the Lord to be his God. In his response we have the act of not only a man but of the man, of humanity as a general conscious life." *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, p. 256. "Humanity was not an abstraction while Adam the individual was conscious. . . . It found in him a real conscious existence, in the free exercise of its mighty powers—a living personality, reasoning and willing for itself." P. 258. "Humanity rebelled." P. 259. "We all were comprehended in Adam in the form of a general conscious life. The will of this life perpetuated the rebellion. . . . So that his act was in fact our act." P. 260. "His individual personality was limited wholly to himself. But a whole world of like separate personalities lay involved in his life at the same time, as a generic principle or root. And all these, in a deep sense, form at last but one and the same life. Adam lives in his posterity as truly as he ever lived in his own person. They participate in his whole nature, soul and body, and are truly bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh." *Mystical Presence*, p. 161. "The fall of Adam is adjudged to be the fall of his posterity because it was so actually. The union in law here is a union in life. The fall itself forms a certain condition or state, which supposes life as its subject, and how then could the one be imputed without the presence of the other? May an attribute or quality be made to extend in a real way beyond the substance to which it is attached, and in which only it can have any

real existence? The moral relations of Adam, and his moral character too, are made over to us at the same time. Our participation in the actual unrighteousness of his life, forms the ground of our participation in his guilt and liability to punishment." P. 160. Everything, therefore, is made to depend on the real objective existence of a generic life, which is an "entity," a "substance," which is at once corporeal and incorporeal, that is, which is one life developing itself outwardly and inwardly. In this life is consciousness, intelligence, will. It is "a conscious life." Individual men are but the separate manifestations of this life in connection with an external organism. On this ground, it is assumed that the act of Adam was the act of his posterity, being the act of the intelligence, will, and conscious life common to them all. And the moral character and relations, the inward pollution as well as the guilt which attached to him attach also to us, because they pertain to the life common to him and to the whole human race.

As our object is exposition and not refutation, we might pass this exhibition of the anthropology of the mystical system and its application to our relation to Adam without remark. It may be well, however, before proceeding further, just to say a few words on the subject. First, in reference to the assumption that there is no real dualism in the constitution of man, that the body is the necessary condition of the existence of the soul, that the two are only the different forms of manifestation of one and the same life, we would remark that this doctrine is inconsistent with the common consciousness of men, who uniformly refer certain acts and states to the mind as one subject or substance, and certain others to the body as a different subject or substance. The attributes of mind and of the body are in their nature so different as to render it impossible to refer both classes to the same subject. Both belong to the same person, but the person in our present state of existence, is mysteriously constituted of two distinct substances. As this is a fact revealed in the common consciousness of men, it enters into the avowed convictions of men of all ages and in all parts of the world. Every nation, ancient or modern, civilized or



savage, has believed in the separate existence of the soul. This is manifest from their doctrines concerning a future state. This is also the faith of the universal church. The Greeks, the Latins, the Lutherans, the Reformed, in short the whole Christian world believe that the soul lives and acts in the full exercise of all its faculties, after it has left the body. This the mystical system, as we have seen, denies. Olshausen in support of his position, "No body, no soul," reduces the consciousness of the departed soul to a minimum, and then asserts that this feeble flickering of its life is sustained in connection with the scattered elements of its body.\* The theory, therefore, is

\* The reader may be interested in seeing what Dr. Nevin has to say in answer to this fatal objection to his whole theory. Anything feebler or more unsatisfactory we have never seen in print from the pen of an able man. "To some," he says, "possibly this representation (viz. that the body is the necessary condition of the activity of the soul) may seem to be contradicted by what the Scriptures teach of the separate existence of the soul between death and the resurrection; and it must be admitted that we are met here with a difficulty which it is not easy at present to solve. Let us, however, not mistake the true state of the case. The difficulty is not to reconcile Scripture with a psychological theory; but to bring it into harmony with itself. For it is certain that the Scriptures teach such an identification of soul and body in the proper human personality, as clearly, at least, as they intimate a continued consciousness on the part of the soul between death and the resurrection. The doctrine of *immortality* in the Bible, is such as to include always the idea of the resurrection. It is an *ἀναστήσις* in *τῷ σώματι*. The whole argument in the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, as well as the representation, 1 Thess. iv. 13-18, proceeds on the assumption, that the life of the body, as well as that of the soul, is indispensable to the perfect state of our nature as human. The soul then, during the intermediate state, cannot possibly constitute, in the biblical view, a complete man; and the case requires besides that we should conceive of its relation to the body as still in force, not absolutely destroyed but only suspended. The whole condition is interimistic, and by no possibility of conception capable of being thought of as complete and final. When the resurrection body appears, it will not be as a new frame abruptly created for the occasion, and brought to the soul in the way of outward addition and supplement. It will be found to hold in strict organic continuity with the body as it existed before death, as the action of the same law of life; which implies that this law has not been annihilated, but suspended only in the intermediate state. In this character, however, it must be regarded as resting in some way, (for where else could it rest?) in the separate life, as it is called, of the soul itself; the slumbering power of the resurrection ready at the proper time, in obedience to Christ's powerful word, to clothe itself with its former actual nature, in full identity with the form it carried before death,

in direct conflict with the Scriptures, which not only everywhere teach the distinction between the soul and body as two subjects, but specially the full conscious existence of the soul between death and the resurrection. With difficulties of this sort, however, the authors of this system were untrammelled. They received nothing on the mere authority of the Bible, and discarded what did not harmonize with their theory. Schleiermacher did not believe in a creation in time, an extra-mundane God, in angels, Satan, or sin, or disembodied souls. Those who adopt his principles are reduced to the sad necessity of either holding a philosophy in conflict with their theology, or of explaining away the plainest teachings of the Bible. The latter alternative is sure to be chosen.

As to the doctrine of a generic life as a real objective reality, an "underlying substance" in which all individual men are one, we would say that it is a sheer hypothesis. From the nature of the case there can be no direct evidence of its existence. It is an assumption to account for certain phenomena. If those phenomena can be as satisfactorily accounted for on another hypothesis, the whole foundation of the theory is gone. Again the theory in its present form, notwithstanding its affinity with ancient realism, is new. Both Ullmann and Dr. Nevin teach that the ignoring of this idea of a generic life vitiated the theology of the Reformers. Then again this modern theory is neither one thing nor the other. If men would say with Schleiermacher that God is "not a Being by the side of other beings," (*nicht Ding neben Dingen*) but the "Totality and system of all things;" if they would say that he is the "underlying substance in which all lives are one," that as the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God externalizes himself variously in the world, then we could understand what is meant by this generic life. But although this seems to be the esoteric sense of many of the utterances of the professedly theistic portion of the Schleiermacher school, yet it is so baldly pantheistic that it has to be stated with so many limitations and

though under a far higher order of existence. Only then can the salvation of the soul be considered as complete. All at last is one life; the subject of which is the totality of a believer's person, comprehending soul and body alike from the beginning of the process to the end."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 171.



modifications that the real idea intended becomes altogether confused.\* There is nothing in the Scriptures in favour of this doctrine of a generic life of the race having objective reality of its own apart from the personalities in which it is revealed. It is not indeed the design of the Bible to teach us ontology, but the Bible teaches facts. It teaches, for example, the fact that the soul is in a state of conscious activity when separated from the body, and it therefore teaches that the doctrine which denies the possibility of such an existence is false. There are no facts of this kind in the Bible which contradict the common doctrine concerning the nature of man, and necessitate the assumption of this generic life. The Scriptures indeed recognize a common nature as belonging to all men; that is, that all men belong to one and the same class and species of beings, have a common origin, the same physical structure, the same rational and moral faculties, and that they are in the same state of alienation from God as they are born into this world. They also teach that this nature, thus identical in all its essential elements and characteristics, is propagated from parent to child, and thus comes down to us from the progenitors of our race. With this scriptural teaching all the facts of experience agree. Experience also teaches that this nature, thus common to all mankind, may be modified by circumstances of climate, culture, social habits and other causes, so as to assume permanent varieties or types; and still further, that within these varieties there may be lesser peculiarities induced and rendered permanent, as seen in different nations and even families. All this is agreeable to the analogy observed in other departments of nature, animal and vegetable. Every distinct species, whether of animals or vegetables, is found in permanent varieties, more or less marked and more or less permanent. To account for these facts of Scripture and experience, there is no necessity to adopt the theory of a generic life having objective reality. There is no need to

\* This is a vice inherent in the whole system. Strauss says of Schleiermacher himself, "That he betrayed philosophy to theology, and then again theology to philosophy, and precisely this double-facedness and double-meaningness is the essence of his position in the history of theology. And hence his influence from both sides can only be regarded as a blessed curse, or a curse-bearing blessing."—*Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 175.

assume that there is an entity or substance in which the lives of all horses, or all tigers, or all elephants, or all oaks, or all palms inhere, and in which they severally are all one. Who believes in any such generic life of tigers or of oaks? Why then should it be assumed in the case of man? All the Bible assumes, and all that experience teaches, is that God ordained the permanence of species, and fixed the law that like should beget like. If it be demanded how this permanence of species is secured, it may be answered that the knowledge of the *how* is not at all necessary to faith in the fact. If a further answer is required, it may be enough to say that the greatest naturalists assume that the organic germ received from the parent plant or animal is imbued with an immaterial life principle, which determines not only the species but the variety. This life principle is just as individual as the source whence it is derived. Thus in the case of Adam, he was an individual man, with no more of the generic life of the race than any other man. He transmitted to his children his own nature, just as in any other case of reproduction in the animal or vegetable kingdom. The race were no more physically *in* him, than the Hebrews were *in* Abraham, or the Ishmaelites *in* Ishmael. His act was no more the act of the race, except on the ground of a divine covenant, than an act of Abraham was an act of all his posterity. It is very true that any act of Adam which altered his physical or moral constitution, i. e. his nature, might lead to a corresponding change in the physical or moral constitution of his descendants. If he had done anything to change his complexion from the olive of an Asiatic to the black of the African, he might, and probably would, have transmitted that hue to his posterity. But the same may be said of any head of a family or tribe. If any man chooses to account for the hereditary corruption of our race on this principle, though we regard it as both unsatisfactory and unscriptural, as a solution of that dreadful fact, it is at least intelligible. The statement contains a meaning. But when it is said that the act of Adam was truly the act of the race, because he was a generic man, or that humanity as a general life acted in him, the words have no meaning. They convey no idea. As Dr. Nevin would say, they are an empty sound. An act implies an agent, and a



rational act a rational agent, that is, a person. Unless, therefore, humanity is a person, it could not as a generic life have acted in Adam. This, however, is not the theory; humanity as such is impersonal; it comes to personality only in the individual. Into the application of this theory, however, to the solution of the question of original sin, we designedly do not enter. We have far too much work on our hands, in the further exposition of the mystical system, to be accomplished in any reasonable limits of a single article. We must, therefore, content ourselves with remarking, that the consequences drawn from this particular theory of a generic life, in its application to the great doctrines concerning the person of Christ and the method of salvation, are its most effectual refutation. These consequences are such, as we shall proceed to show, that the theory itself must be renounced, or the faith of the church universal be given up.

II. This leads us to the second great division of our subject. The Christology of the mystical system is its centre and sum. All its other doctrines are subordinate to this, and are held for its sake, or are determined by it. There are three general classes of theologians included in the school of Schleiermacher. First, those who are in fact, as he himself was, pantheistic in their interior convictions; secondly, those who are Theists but not Trinitarians; and thirdly, those who sincerely endeavour to bring their theory into harmony with the doctrines of the Bible, and especially with the doctrine of the Trinity. Of course the Christology of these several classes must present important differences, into which it is impossible for us here to enter. We must content ourselves with the general features of the system, and especially in the form in which they are presented by those belonging to the third of the three classes just mentioned. The three principles which determine the Christology of the mystical system, as we have before stated, are, 1. That there is no real dualism in the constitution of man; 2d. That humanity is a generic life, a real entity or substance; and 3d. That there is a (*Wesenseinheit*) real oneness between God and man. As to this last point, Dorner, after endeavouring to show that the old church doctrine as adopted by the Reformed, and as generally modified by the

Lutherans (to suit their doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body) is beset with insuperable difficulties, says that these difficulties and contradictions can only be avoided by giving up the idea that the divine and human in Christ are two different natures, and admitting that they are (*innerlich eines*) inwardly one.\* On a subsequent page (182) he says, we must either reject the doctrine of the Incarnation, or construct a Christology without the assumption of a twofold nature in Christ.

The general statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation, in which all Christians agree, is that the Word was made flesh, God was found in fashion as a man, or, God assumed our nature. This may mean what the Church universal understands it to mean, as her faith is expressed in the decisions of the first six œcumenical councils, adopted by the Greeks, the Latins, the Reformed, and Lutherans. Those councils declared that in the one person of the Lord Jesus Christ the two natures, human and divine, are united without mixture or confusion, inseparably and perpetually, so that he is perfect God and perfect man. The union does not destroy the difference of the natures, but the properties of each are retained. In the Council of Constantinople it was decided that there are in Christ two wills and operations, the one human and the other divine. To the integrity or completeness of the human nature "a true body and a reasonable soul" are declared to belong. Christ, therefore, is declared to be as to his divine nature consubstantial with the Father, and as to his human nature consubstantial with us men. In opposition to this catholic statement of the doctrine, some modern theologians, such as Martensen and Ebrard, seem to adopt a view very similar to that of Beron in the early ages, who held that the Logos assumed the form of a man, that is, subjected himself to the limitations of humanity. The infinite became finite, the eternal and omnipresent imposed on himself the limitations of time and space, God became man.† The statement of Ebrard is, the Logos assumed "the existence form of man." He illustrates his idea thus. "In the case of a king's son, his

\* Christologie, p. 178 of the first edition.

† See Dorner, vol. i. p. 541 of the edition of 1851.



royalty is his original nature, servitude an assumed form of existence." In other words, he adds, Der ewige Sohn Gottes sich in freiem Selbeschränkungsakte bestimmt hat, in die Existenzform eines menschlichen Lebens-centrums einzugehen, so dass er nun als solches agierte von der Empfängniss an, und als der in diese Form eingegangene sich einen menschlichen Leib bildete u. s. w." i. e. *The eternal Son of God, by a free act of self-limitation, determined to assume the existence form of a centre of human life, so that he acted as such from the conception onward, and having assumed this form, he fashioned for himself a body, &c.\** By God's becoming flesh, therefore, he understands, ein Eingehen des Logos in eine neue Seynsform. According to this view there are not two natures in Christ (in the established sense of the word nature), but only two forms of existence, a prior and posterior, of one and the same nature. Another form of statement is, as we have seen, that humanity, by a regular process of historical development, attained the point of oneness with God in the person of Christ. Another is, that this process, having been disturbed, or being in its nature inadequate, God by a supernatural act constituted the person of Christ, as the ideal man, and made him a new life-centre, or point of departure; so that from him a new development of humanity begins. The most common mode of presenting the doctrine is, that the Logos assumed our fallen humanity. By this, we are told, is not to be understood that he assumed an individual body and soul, so that he became a man, but generic humanity, so that he became *the man*. And by generic humanity is to be understood a life-power, that peculiar law of life, corporeal and incorporeal, which develops itself outwardly as a body, and inwardly as a soul. The Son, therefore, became incarnate in humanity, in that objective reality, entity, or substance, in which all human lives are one. Having assumed this life-power, whose law is to develop itself inwardly and outwardly, Christ had a soul and body, but the incarnation was in the "substance" lying back of these. On this fact the whole significance and efficacy of the union is made to depend. Otherwise it would be a theophany, without

\* Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 77.

permanent value to the race. Olshausen, in his comment on John i. 14, says, "It could not be said that the Word was made man, which would imply that the Redeemer was a man by the side of other men, whereas, as the second Adam, he represented the totality of human nature in his exalted comprehensive personality." To the same effect he says in his remarks on Rom. v. 15, "If Christ were a man among other men, it would be impossible to conceive how his suffering and obedience could have an essential influence on mankind; he could then only operate as an example; but he is to be regarded, even apart from his divine nature, as *the man*, i. e. as realizing the absolute idea of humanity, and including it potentially in himself spiritually as Adam did corporeally." To this point Archdeacon Wilberforce devotes the third chapter of his book, and represents the whole value of Christ's work as depending upon it. If this be denied, he says, "the doctrines of atonement and sanctification, though confessed in words, become a mere empty phraseology." Dr. Nevin, in his *Mystical Presence*, p. 210, says, "The word became flesh; not a single man only, as one among many; but *flesh*, or humanity, in its universal conception. How else could he be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence for the human world as such? How else could the value of his mediatorial work be made over to us in a real way by a true imputation, and not a legal fiction only? The entire scheme of the Christian salvation requires and assumes throughout this view of the incarnation, and no other. To make it a mere individual case, a fact of no wider force than the abstract person of Jesus himself, thus resolving his relationship to his people into their common relationship to Adam, is to turn all at last into an unreal theophany, and thus to overthrow the doctrine altogether." Thus the whole scheme of salvation is made to depend on a certain view of anthropology. Unless we believe in a generic humanity as an objective reality, a substance underlying all individual lives, we cannot believe the gospel. And unless we believe that the Son of God became incarnate, not "in an individual case," but in this generic nature, we deny any real incarnation, and resolve the whole matter into a mere ocular illusion. In the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1850, in



answer to an article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Dr. Nevin says of the critic, "His own idea of the incarnation is plainly that it did not enter into the organization of the world at all, as a fact of permanent force. Probably he has no sense whatever of this organization as a vast whole completing itself in man, and thus reaching forward as a single historical process from the beginning of the world to the end. The world is for him neither organism nor history, but a vast sand heap, in which men are thrown together outwardly, to be formed for eternity as so many separate units, each perfect and complete by itself. The incarnation, of course, in such view becomes one of those naked units only, the man Jesus mysteriously made God for himself alone, an abstraction that comes into no real connection with our general humanity beyond the limits of his person. He stands in the world a mere theophany, not of a few hours only, as in the days of Abraham, but for thirty-three years; a sublime avatar, fantastically [!] paraded thus long before men's eyes only to be translated to heaven, and continue there (for the imagination) in no real union with the world's life whatever. This, thus left behind by the transient apparition, pursues its old course, including in its living stream nothing more than has belonged to it from the beginning." P. 7. It belongs to the force of Dr. Nevin's character to outherod Herod on all occasions; and he generally does it, as in the above extract, by the way of implication and negation rather than by direct assertion. We have to transmute his negative statements into the relative affirmations to get at his real meaning. The world is an organism. Men are not units. Humanity is a stream of life. Individual men stand related to that stream as the waves to the sea. The Son of God became incarnate, not in one of those waves, but in the stream itself. Jesus alone did not become God in virtue of the incarnation. The race becomes God. Humanity is deified and flows on, not as of old, a stream of mere human, but of theanthropic life. Unless we take this view of the incarnation, he elsewhere says, "all pretended orthodoxy is reduced to a mere empty sham." *Review*, March 1850, p. 173. What Christ assumed we are told was "that living law or power, which, whether in Adam alone, or in all his pos-

terity, forms at once the entire fact of humanity, irrespectively of the particular human existences in which it may appear." P. 178. In the *Review*, April 1853, Christ is said to have assumed "our nature as a general life," "the substance of the human world," "the whole humanity generically," which was brought "into union with Divinity in his person," and thus it was "restored to its lawful relation to its Creator." "This for all time is henceforth the measure of its true idea." "This is true humanity." "Christ did thus restore our nature to its right relations; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea." P. 263. It was not, therefore, an individual human body and soul that was brought into personal union with the eternal Son of God in the incarnation, but humanity as a general life, as it was henceforth to exist in the persons of believers. "This is true humanity," that is, humanity in that personal union with God which took place in Christ is the true idea of human nature; and the normal relation of man to God is that which Christ, who was at once God and man, sustains to the eternal Father. "This divine-human life, as it has come to exist in Jesus Christ" "perpetuates itself by its own inherent law," and is Christianity. We have here the answer to the question, What is Christianity? It is a life. It is the life of Christ. It is the "conscious union of Divinity and humanity in one real life."

It is to be remembered that humanity as a life includes body and soul; the one cannot be without the other. That is, such is the law of this life, that it manifests itself not only in thought and feeling, but in an external physical organism. Christ, therefore, in assuming humanity as a life-power, developed for himself a true body and a rational soul, and wherever his humanity is, there it is both corporeally and incorporeally, and as it is inseparably united with his divine nature, and as that nature is omnipresent, so is Christ everywhere present as to soul, body, and Divinity. "Christ's life," says Dr. Nevin, "was one; to enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality. To divide the humanity of Christ is to destroy it; to take it away and lay it no man can tell where. . . . Christ's humanity is not his soul separately taken;



just as little as it is his body separately taken. It is neither soul nor body as such, but the everlasting, indissoluble union of both." "Either Christ's human life is not formed in us at all, or it must be formed in us as a human life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form and project itself in space." *Mystical Presence*, p. 170. "We may divide Christ in our thoughts, abstracting his Divinity from his humanity, or his soul from his body. But no such dualism has place in his actual person. If then he is to be received by us at all it must be in a whole way." P. 181. Calvin, he says, "dwells too much on the life-giving virtue of Christ's flesh simply; as if this was not necessarily and inseparably knit to his soul, and to his Divinity too, as a single indivisible life; so that where the latter form of existence is present in a real way, the other must be present too, so far as its utmost nature is concerned, to the same extent." P. 157. In the *Mercersburg Review*, March 1850, it is taught at length that there is a perpetual presence of "Christ's manhood" in the world, that his man's nature is here now; that the acts of Christ in the world are the acts not of his Divinity only, but of his manhood, and therefore that manhood must be here. This ubiquity of Christ's human nature is not to be conceived of as an ubiquity of his individual body, or as a material extension. A distinction is to be made between "the simple man and the universal man here joined in one person." This universal man or humanity is "a law," "a life power," raised above the limitations of time and space, but it is nevertheless the whole of humanity in its true force and idea. "The flesh of Christ, as begotten by the Holy Ghost, and as rising generically into, and uniting with, his divine life, becomes itself a πνευματικόν; so that whilst all its attributes, holding only in time and space, are left behind, its inward power comprehending all that is really necessary as the germ of an actual humanity, remains permanently and for ever linked with his person." *Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 512. It was very generally objected to Schleiermacher that he reduced the historical to a mere ideal Christ, or if he admitted a historical God-man, he represented his existence after his course in this world as merged in a general life. To this the above representation

would seem to agree. The flesh of Christ rises "into his divine life;" all that belongs "to time and space," i. e. all the limitations of time and space are left behind; nothing remains but "a power." The common statement, however, is that Christ is both an individual and universal man, so that while his human nature, as the germ of a new life, is ever and everywhere present in the world, his own human body and soul are in heaven.

The hypostatic union, therefore, is the assumption on the part of the eternal Son of God not simply or primarily of a true body and a reasonable soul, but of humanity as a generic life, of our fallen humanity, of that entity or substance in which all human lives are one. The effects of this union are, 1. That humanity is taken into Divinity, it is exalted into a true divine life. The life of Christ is one. It may be designated as divine, or as human. It is both, it is "divine human." On this point, more than any other feature of the mystical system, its advocates are specially full and earnest. We have already seen that Schleiermacher, the father of the system, ignores all essential difference between God and the world. They differ in our conception, and functionally, but are essentially one. We have seen that Dörner, the learned and accomplished historian of the doctrine concerning Christ's person, avows that the church view of two distinct substances in the same person involves endless contradictions, and that no true Christology can be framed which does not proceed on the assumption of the essential unity of God and man. We have also seen that Ullmann makes this Wesenseinheit, (essential oneness) between the divine and human, the fundamental idea of Christianity. We have further seen that Dr. Nevin denies any real dualism in Christ, saying that while we may separate the Divinity from the humanity as united in his person in thought, they are nevertheless one; that his divine nature is human in the strict sense of the term. It is, therefore, taught, "that the properties of the divine nature attach, through the central consciousness, to the human," and "the properties of the human attach, in the same way, to the divine." The Lutherans had taught that divine attributes in virtue of the hypostatical union belong to the human nature of Christ,



but the assertion that human attributes were transferred to the divine nature, they pronounced with one voice to be *blasphemia horribilis*. This difficulty, or rather the contradiction of infinite attributes belonging to a finite subject, and of the attributes of the divine nature and not the nature itself being transferred to humanity, has been gotten over, as we have seen, in the mystical system, by denying any essential difference, any difference in substance, between the divine and human. As in man there is no dualism between soul and body, so in Christ there is no dualism between his divine and human nature. They are *one* life. But human nature is a life and the divine nature is a life; if the life is one, the nature is one. As, therefore, in man the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God reveals himself in human nature. He takes it up into his Divinity so as to constitute with it one nature or life. The divine and human, therefore, in Christ can only be distinguished in thought. They are one. The hypostatic union is only humanity in its ideal state. The human nature is thereby exalted into a "higher sphere;" it becomes divine but remains human. These are only different forms of one and the same life. Therefore, it is said that humanity itself is raised into the sphere of the same life [i. e. the divine life] and completely transferred with its power, in the everlasting glorification of the Son of Man." *Mystical Presence*, p. 224. "The glorification of Christ then was the full advancement of our human nature itself to the power of a divine life." p. 226. The divine Logos, it is said on the same page, "subk for the moment into the limitations of the fallen mortal nature with which it became thus incorporated," for the purpose of raising that nature "into the same order of existence." The great design and effect of the incarnation was thus to raise our nature into "the same order of existence" with the eternal Logos; in other words, to bring humanity to the knowledge and consciousness of its oneness with God. This idea pervades the whole system. Divinity and humanity are united as one life. The latter is so far identical with the former as to be only different as the mode of manifestation. When we receive the one we receive the other. If Christ dwells in us, it is this divine human life which dwells in us, the incarnate

Logos. If in the Lord's supper we are partakers of the body of Christ, it is "the divine human life of the Son of Man himself" of which we are the participants.

2. As, however, the humanity which God took into personal union with himself was our fallen humanity, the elevation of that nature to the sphere of a divine life required a protracted and painful conflict. Our nature had to be healed before it could be merged as one life in the life of God. The second effect of the incarnation, although the first in order of sequence, was this struggle or conflict by which it was reconciled to God, and brought back to its normal relation of oneness with the divine nature. In consequence of the entrance of the Logos into the generic fallen humanity, a new life-power was communicated to it, which overcame all its infirmities, and raised it ultimately into the life of God. This was at once the work of redemption and atonement. The reconciliation of God and man, as Ullmann and all other advocates of the system say, was effected not *by* Christ, but *in* him. The personal union of the divine and human in him was the reconciliation of heaven and earth. The two natures became united and merged in one life. Generic humanity, therefore, before and apart from its manifestation in individuals, was healed, sanctified, imbued with righteousness and holiness, and in this restored and elevated state was prepared to pass over to Christ's people, and as Ullmann says, gradually to the whole world. The whole work of redemption and reconciliation was effected *in* the person of Christ, by the mere fact of the incarnation. This idea is more or less distinctly brought into view in the numerous citations already given. It is not necessary, therefore, to multiply proof passages. In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said, "If Christ did take up the life, and so the substance of the human world, *the whole* humanity generically, into union with Divinity in his person, and restore it to its lawful relation to its Creator, then verily are its sins taken away, and it will be, rather it *is* saved." P. 263. In the *Mystical Presence*, p. 166, it is said, "The assumption of humanity on the part of the Logos involved the necessity of suffering, as the only way in which the new life with which it was thus joined, could triumph over the law of sin and death it was



called to surmount. The passion of the Son of God was the world's spiritual crisis, in which the principle of health came to its last struggle with the principle of disease, and burst forth from the very bosom of the grave itself in the form of immortality. This was the atonement, Christ's victory over sin and hell." That is, the atonement was the successful struggle of the Logos with "the law of sin and death," in that generic humanity which he had assumed. The advocates of this system, it may be remarked in passing, always speak of Christ as sinless. They say he assumed "our fallen human nature, sin excepted." It is hard, however, to reconcile this with their other statements. The nature which he assumed is said to be fallen, to be diseased, which can hardly mean anything else than morally corrupt; it was infected with "a law of sin and death." At the same time it is said that his life was *one*, and therefore he had in himself, in his own conscious life, not a pure, but a diseased humanity, a law of sin in his own person. They doubtless have some way of reconciling these apparent contradictions. What that way is we do not understand, unless with Schleiermacher's other doctrines they adopt his view of the nature of sin, as only a necessary and temporary limitation, and having no existence for God as sin. That the work of redemption was effected by the fact of the incarnation, and in the person of Christ, is taught by Ullmann very distinctly when he says, Christianity "represents God and humanity as united not merely in idea, but in a real human life, and, therefore, assumes a real redeeming power as infused into our nature, which, not indeed by a single act of consciousness, but by a severe moral process, but thus only the more thoroughly, effects the union of God and man." P. 40. The healing process effected in Christ by the union of the Logos with fallen humanity in his person, is repeated in the case of every believer by the power of Christ's sanctified humanity, introduced as a new principle of life into that humanity, as manifested in the believer's person. "It is the union of Divinity and humanity in Christ, which not simply qualifies him for the work he was appointed to perform, but of itself involves in his person that reconciliation between heaven and earth, God and man, which the idea of redemption requires, and for which

there could be no room in any other form." March 1849, p. 154. "The reconciliation of heaven and earth" it is said, p. 161, "lies in the mystery of incarnation itself, and involves potentially and necessarily all the atonement and redemption that follow." Such is also the doctrine of Wilberforce, "The name Mediator," he says, "is not bestowed by reason of any work," but because "of the permanent union in one person of God and man." "His incarnation," says Dr. Nevin, "is not to be regarded as a device *in order* to his mediation, the needful preliminary and condition of this merely as an independent and separate work; it is itself the mediatorial fact, in all its height and depth, and length and breadth." *Review*, March 1850, p. 170. "Christ has redeemed the world, or the nature of man as fallen in Adam, by so taking it into union with his own higher nature as to deliver it from the curse and power of sin; meeting the usurpation of this false principle with firm resistance from the start; triumphantly repelling its assaults; and in the end carrying captivity captive by carrying his man's nature itself, through the portals of the resurrection, to the right hand of God in glory." P. 181.

3. The third effect of the incarnation was the introduction of a new principle into the life of the world. As the Son of God took upon him the universal life of the world, and as the effect of the hypostatic union was to overcome "the law of sin and death" with which that life was infected, this renovated, sanctified human nature by the law of development passes over to others. As generic humanity once existed in Adam, and was communicated by him to his posterity, so that same humanity united with Divinity as one life, is communicated to those in Christ. It is as much a germ, as much an universal life to be revealed in numberless personalities, in the one case as in the other. This idea is abundantly asserted in the passages already quoted. In no other way, it is said, can we be made partakers of the benefits of the incarnation. "That the race might be saved, it was necessary that a work should be wrought, not beyond it, but in it; and this inward salvation to be effective must lay hold of the race itself in its organic, universal character, before it could extend to individuals. . . . Such an inward salvation of the race required that it should be



joined in a living way with the divine nature itself, as represented by the everlasting Word or Logos, the fountain of all created light and life. The Word accordingly became flesh, that is, assumed humanity into union with itself. It was not an act whose force was intended to stop in one man himself, to be transplanted soon afterwards to heaven. Nor was it intended merely to serve as the necessary basis of the great work of atonement, the power of which might be applied to the world subsequently in the way of outward imputation. It had this use indeed, but not its first and most comprehensive necessity. The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos, as a permanent source of life." *Mystical Presence*, p. 165. The incarnation "is the supernatural linking itself to the onward flow of the world's life, and becoming thenceforth the ground and principle of the entire organism." P. 167. This new life "is in all respects a true human life. It is in one sense divine. It springs from the Logos. But it is not the life of the Logos separately taken. It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his own person, but passes over to his people." "The process by which the whole is accomplished is not mechanical, but organic. It takes place in the way of history, growth, regular living development." P. 167. This is the grand idea of the whole system. Humanity as developed from Adam impeded and weakened by sin could never work out its true idea, could never attain the end contemplated in its original constitution. But united with the divine Logos it is imbued with a higher life, and being developed from him it attains in his people, by a regular process of growth, its full perfection. The life of the believer is as much an organic continuance of the humanity of Christ, as the life of the men of this generation "holds" in organic continuity with the life of Adam. The generic human nature, the substance which underlies the lives of men, and in which they are all one, is, since the incarnation, (so far as the church is concerned) the divine human nature of Christ, that is, Divinity and humanity united as one life. Christ's humanity constitutes the church.

III. Soterology. The whole theory of salvation as modified by the mystical system, is determined by the idea presented at the close of the preceding paragraph. Humanity as a whole was in Adam. He was the race. Human nature, as a generic life, sinned in him—became guilty and polluted; and, as this same life is the underlying substance, in which all men are one, it follows that the act of Adam was the act of all men—its guilt and pollution belong to them in the same measure and for the same reason that they belong to him. There is no imputation of his sin to his posterity further than the recognition of the fact that it is their sin. In like manner, humanity, as a whole, was in Christ in personal union with the eternal Logos. "He was the race." Human nature, as a generic life, united with the divine nature, conquered the law of sin in the old nature, fulfilled all righteousness, triumphed over death, and was exalted to the right hand of God. This divine human life, this sanctified human nature, is the generic life of believers, in which they are all one. They therefore did all Christ did, performed all his acts. Those acts were the acts of the life which passes over to them, or is inserted in them, with all its merits, its righteousness, its holiness and power. At first it is feeble, (as in the case of our natural life, derived from Adam,) but it is gradually developed, and ultimately triumphs over sin and death. The resurrection of Christ was not a miracle. It was the natural, legitimate working of his divine human life, as much as waking out of sleep is the proper working of our ordinary nature. In like manner, the final resurrection of believers is not miraculous; it is the development of their theanthropic nature, the legitimate result of the law of life which they derive from Christ. The following points are involved in the above statement: viz. 1. That the divine human life of Christ is communicated to his people; 2. That that life includes his body, soul, and Divinity; 3. That it bears with it the merits, the righteousness, the holiness and power of Christ, and is their salvation; not its ground or procuring cause, but the salvation itself; 4. That this generic humanity, in union with the divine Logos, is the common life of Christ's mystical body, constituting all his people one. All these points are included in the passages already quoted from the advocates of the



theory. Our time and space admit of only a few more citations in support of the representation just given. Ullmann, in a passage already quoted, says that the "oneness of Christ with God" is not something individual, isolated, or transient, but with his life is communicated to believers.\* In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said: we do not "partake of his Divinity alone, but of his manhood, his glorified humanity, bound with his Divinity in the bond of a common life." P. 273. The saint "partakes of his divine human life as really as by nature he partakes of the corrupt life of Adam." P. 272. The resurrection of Christ was not "the fruit of his creative and omnipotent energy, as is the case with miracles in the world of nature." His "life asserted its victorious power over death, and raised the body of Christ from its bondage, just as our natural life asserts its power over sleep, and by its own energy throws it off." The saints will be raised at last not "by a miracle in the ordinary sense," but "by the activity of their Saviour's life, which has its abode in them." P. 270. Christ himself is "the ground and source of salvation, rather than his works. His merits are reached only through his life." P. 267. "Christ's acts were the acts of the life which dwelt in him, the activity of his divine human personality, and, as such, are the acts of that same life, whatever form it may put on in the process of outward development;" that is, were the acts of all his people in whom it is developed. "Christ restored our nature to its right relations; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea. And if we, as individuals, would stand in the like relations, we can do so only by standing in living union with this new humanity, in it as our life element. No simple reckoning is sufficient in the case. It requires an actual transfer of our whole being, an ingrafting into the stock of living humanity. Thus do we partake of the salvation of Jesus Christ, only as we are penetrated with its true idea, with human nature in its true relation to God; that is, in living union with him. Christ, therefore, himself gives us the true mode of imputation, when he says, 'Ye must be born again.'" P. 263.

\* Studien und Kritiken, 1845, p. 41.

The points insisted upon by Dr. Nevin in Section II. Chap. iii. of his *Mystical Presence*, are, 1. That our nature as derived from Adam is incapable of raising itself to its true relation to God. 2. That the union in which we stand to Adam "extends to his entire person, body as well as soul." 3. That in Christ our fallen "humanity was exalted again to a new imperishable divine life." "The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos as a permanent source of life." 4. The value of Christ's sufferings depends on this view of the incarnation. 5. "The Christian salvation, as comprehended in Christ, is a new life." "It is a new life introduced into the very centre of humanity itself." 6. This new life "is in all respects a true human life." "It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." 7. "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people; thus constituting the church." 8. "As joined with Christ, then, we are one with him in his life." "Christ communicates his own life substantially to the soul on which he acts, causing it to grow into his very nature. This is the *mystical union*; the basis of our whole salvation; the only medium by which it is possible for us to have an interest in the grace of Christ under any other view." 9. Our relation to Christ is immeasurably more deep and intimate than our relation to Adam. 10. "The mystical union includes necessarily a participation in the entire humanity of Christ." "The life of Christ is *one*. To enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality." 11. So we too "are embraced by it in a whole way." This new life "must extend to us in the totality of our nature," body as well as soul. "We have just seen it to be a true human life before it reaches us. It is the life of the *incarnate Son of God*." Christ's human life "must be formed in us a *human* life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form, and project itself in space." 12. This is effected, not by different forms of action, one for the soul and another for the body, but by one undivided process, as the humanity of Christ is one living organic process. 13. This does not involve a material, or actual approach of Christ's body to the persons of his people; nor, 14, any ubiquity or



idealistic dissipation of his body. "Adam was at once an individual and a whole race." So in the case of Christ. 15. This union is more intimate than any other. 16. It is effected by the Holy Ghost. 17. It is apprehended by faith. 18. This new life includes degrees and is completed in the resurrection. "The bodies of the saints in glory will be only the last result, in organic continuity, of the divine life of Christ implanted in their souls at regeneration." "We can make no intelligible distinction here," it is said, p. 181, "between the crucified body of Christ and his body as now glorified in heaven. Both at last are one and the same life." "We partake not of his Divinity only, nor yet of his Spirit as separated from himself, but also of his true and proper humanity." On page 189, it is said, "The judgment of God must be according to truth. He cannot reckon to any one an attribute or quality which does not belong to him in fact. He cannot declare him to be in a relation or state, which is not actually his own, but the position merely of another." No federal union or legal fiction, we are told, will here answer. "Righteousness, like guilt, is an attribute which supposes a subject in which it inheres, and from which it cannot be abstracted without ceasing to exist altogether. In the case before us, this subject is the mediatorial nature, or life of the Saviour himself. Whatever there may be of merit, virtue, efficacy, or moral value in any way, in the mediatorial work of Christ, it is all lodged in his life, by the power of which alone this work has been accomplished, and in the presence of which only it can have either reality or stability." P. 191. "That which is imparted to us through our faith, by the power of the Holy Ghost, is the true divine human life of the Son of Man himself." P. 243. And this divine human life which wrought all Christ's righteousness, is imbued with his holiness and power; becoming our life, we thereby have his righteousness, holiness, and power inherent in us, as truly and really as they are in him. "The supernatural, as thus made permanent and historical in the church, must, in the nature of the case, correspond with the form of the supernatural as it appeared originally in Christ himself. For it is all one and the same life or constitution. The church must have a theanthropic character throughout. The union of the divine

and human in her constitution must be inward and real, a continuous revelation of God in the flesh, exalting this last continuously into the sphere of the Spirit." P. 247.

It is not worth while to multiply citations. The whole thing is plain. We are one with Adam because he was the race; humanity was in him as a generic life, and sinned his sin, and incurred his guilt, and pollution. Guilt and pollution are attributes which must inhere in a subject or substance; that substance is generic humanity, which unfolds itself in a multitude of individual persons. Its acts, therefore, are their acts, its qualities or attributes belong to them. The eternal Son of God assumed this fallen humanity into personal union with himself, whereby it was constituted a divine-human life. That life triumphed, through suffering and conflict, over "the law of sin and death," inherent in our fallen humanity, and sanctified it, and exalted it into the divine nature. This new life, therefore, is divine-human. It is truly divine and truly human. It is the union of Divinity and humanity as one life. This divine-human life is communicated to the people of Christ by the new birth, as they receive the nature of Adam by their natural birth. And as the nature derived from Adam comes laden with guilt, pollution, and death; as it develops itself outwardly in a frail, natural body, and inwardly in a blinded, guilty, and polluted soul; as it begins feebly in the infant, and gradually reaches maturity, and then succumbs to death, and ripens in perdition; as it develops itself not only personally in individuals, but in the whole course of history; so on the other hand, this divine-human, or theanthropic nature of Christ comes to the believer fraught with righteousness, holiness, and immortality; it develops itself in him as body and soul, as a glorious spiritual body, and a righteous, holy soul; it begins feebly, but matures gradually, until it bursts into the resurrection, and culminates in glory; and as a generic life it reveals itself not only in the individual, but in the church, which is a living organism. It is Christ's divine humanity in a concrete form. That is, it is the form in which Christ's theanthropic nature unfolds itself in the world. This is the foundation of

IV. The Ecclesiology of the mystical system, of which our limits forbid our saying anything more than is involved in the



preceding exposition. The church, as we have seen, is declared to be a real and permanent "revelation of God in the flesh." The church "is not a mere outward organization, but a divine-human life power, originating in the person of Christ, with an inward, historical connection with the world, containing the very help we need and must have as sinners." *Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 529. "Christ's presence in the world is in and by his mystical body the church. As a real human presence, carrying in itself the power of a new life for the race in general, it is no abstraction or object of thought merely, but a glorious living reality, continuously at work, in an organic and historical way in the world's constitution. . . . This is the idea of the church. It comes from within, and not from without. It grows out of the mystery of the incarnation, apprehended as an abiding fact." *Review*, March 1850, p. 186. "The idea of the church, as thus standing between Christ and single Christians, implies of necessity visible organization, common worship, a regular public ministry and ritual, and, to crown all, especially grace-bearing sacraments. To question this is to give up to the same extent the sense of Christ's mediation as a perennial fact, now and always taking effect upon the economy of the world, through the church as his mystical body. Let it be felt that the incarnation is a mystery not simply past, and not simply beyond the world, but at this time in full force for the world, carrying in itself the whole value of Christ's sacrifice and resurrection as an undying "ONCE FOR ALL"—the true conception of the mediatorial supremacy, as the real headship of Christ's manhood over all in behalf of the church, and for its salvation; let it be felt at the same time that this mystery teaches men in and by the church, which itself is made to challenge their faith for this reason, as something supernatural and divine; and it becomes at once impossible to resist the feeling that the powers of the world to come are actually at hand, in its functions and services, with the same objective reality that attaches to the powers of nature, under their own form, and in their own place. To see no more in the ministry and offices of the church, in this view, than the power of mere outward declaration and testimony, such as we might have in

any secular school, betrays a rationalistic habit of mind, which only needs to be set free from the indolence of uninquiring tradition, that it may be led to deny altogether that Christ has ever or at all come in the flesh." P. 187. "The church contains ordinances and sacraments divinely instituted, for the purpose of bringing this *theanthropic* life of the Redeemer into real contact with our nature." October 1854, p. 518. "The divine-human merits of Christ's life are not received immediately and directly from his person by faith, in an abstract way, but mediately through the church, and especially by the sacraments which are instituted definitely for this purpose." P. 519. "The sacraments are bearers of the divine-human life of the Redeemer." P. 520.

Such is the answer which modern speculation has given to the question, What is Christianity? It is the *theanthropic* life of Christ. The eternal Logos having assumed our fallen humanity, and taken it into life union with himself, his divine-human life is generic human nature, exalted and sanctified; and, developing itself in the church, it is communicated to individuals by the sacraments, which are "the only channels of his grace." It is unfortunate that the sun does not rise on America until it begins to set on Germany. This *Vermittelungstheologie*, (*mediating-theology*), as it is there called, of which Ullmann is the great representative, standing, as Schwarz says, *im centrum des centrums*, has, if we may credit the Germans themselves, already passed away.\* It served for a while to occupy the German mind, and then was shipped to America. Here it has been seized upon with avidity, and presented as the only possible form of Christian theology. It is, however, Christian only in name. You may leave out the name of Christ and every distinguishing fact of Christianity, and the system retain everything essential to it. That humanity, as a generic life, became impeded in its development so as to be unable to realize its true idea without assistance *ab extra*; that God united himself with the world as an organism, and thus enables humanity to attain a true life-union with himself, is the whole system. All the rest is formulas and phrases. The theory, as a theolo-

\* See Schwarz's *Geschichte der neuesten Theologie*, 1856.



gical theory, as an exposition of the method by which sinful men may be restored to the life of God, may be held by a pagan or Mohammedan as well as by a Christian. Even as a philosophy underlying Christian doctrines, it is so uncongenial that it alters the whole nature, objective and subjective, of Christianity. That is, it changes essentially its doctrines, and it alters the whole character of our inward religion. 1. In the first place it alters entirely our relation to Christ. To the believer, the Lord Jesus Christ, as the eternal Son of God, clothed in our nature, very God and very man, in two distinct natures and one person for ever, is the supreme object of love and worship. All the religious affections terminate on him. The believer lives in daily and hourly communion with him; relies on the merit of his righteousness as something out of himself, neither done by him nor wrought in him, as the ground of his acceptance with God. Everything either done by himself or wrought within him, he knows to be finite, human, polluted, and insufficient. He needs an infinite righteousness; he demands immeasurably more than he can either do or experience, to give him confidence with God. He looks to the Lord Jesus as a priest for ever at the right hand of God, continually presenting before God the merit of his satisfaction, and making intercession for us. He looks to him as his Shepherd to guide and feed him day by day; as his King to rule in, reign over, and to protect him from all danger and every enemy. He longs for his personal presence, to be with him that he may behold his glory, worship at his feet, and be perfectly devoted to his service in heaven. According to this new system, all this is altered. We have nothing *now* specially to do with Christ. Adam corrupted humanity, which we receive as a generic life from him. But what have we now to do with Adam? He is nothing to us, any more than the first acorn is to the present oak. So Christ healed and sanctified humanity, which we derive from him. This is an infinite good which he did two thousand years ago, as Adam did us a great harm six thousand years ago. But we are just as much separated from the one as from the other. The life of the one, as of the other, comes to us in the regular course of organic, historical development. No true Christian will allow any philosophy thus to separate him from his Saviour.

He cannot do it. The whole religion of the New Testament and the whole experience of the church suppose each individual soul to be in immediate contact and intercourse with the incarnate Son of God **AS A PERSON**, and not as an internal life; coming to him directly, each for himself, and living in constant and conscious fellowship with him.

2. Not only does this system change our whole relation to Christ as a person, but our whole relation to his mediatorial work. All that Christ did or does in the way of atonement, or satisfaction, or sanctification, according to this theory, was done in humanity as a generic life. He withstood and overcame the law of sin in our fallen nature, he suffered, but triumphed in that conflict, and transmits that sanctified humanity to us. This was the atonement, this is redemption. This system, therefore, sends the sinner naked and shivering into the presence of God, with nothing to rely upon but the modicum of theanthropic life that flickers in his own bosom. He has no righteousness but what is inherent. All he has of righteousness, holiness, joy, or glory, is in himself, in that life which is as much his as the life he derived from Adam, the heights and depths of which are sounded by his own consciousness. If he feels himself to be wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked, he is so, and there is no help for him. All his treasures are within himself. If his theanthropic life does not make him righteous, and holy, and blessed, there is nothing else can do it. The nature he derived from Adam made him subjectively unrighteous as well as miserable; so the nature he derives from Christ must make him subjectively righteous and inwardly blessed, or he must for ever remain unrighteous and condemned. We have nothing but ourselves. Words are of no avail here. It does not help the matter to call our poor, cold, worldly, polluted, sinful life, "divine-human," "theanthropic," "humanity raised to a higher sphere," "imbued with divine power," &c. It is nevertheless something which our own conscience condemns, and our own consciousness tells us is poor and wretched. So that if our inherent righteousness is all we have, we are of all men most miserable.

3. This system not only takes from us Christ and his right-



eousness, but the Holy Ghost. According to the real author of the system there is no Holy Ghost. Schleiermacher did not believe in the Trinity. So far as he was theistic at all, he was a Sabellian. God as God he called the Father; God in the world, the Son; God in the church, the Spirit. It was a mere modal distinction. The common life of the church he designated as the Holy Spirit, but that life was not a person. It had no existence except in the church. In those of his followers who retain speculatively the doctrine of the Trinity, the office of the Spirit almost entirely disappears. It may be safely said that the Holy Spirit is mentioned on the pages of the New Testament one hundred times, where he is mentioned once in the same compass in the writings of the theologians of this school. We do not recollect that he is mentioned more than once, and then only by the way, in the sixty-one passages of Ullmann's dissertation. And no wonder; the system makes no provision for his person or work. What need is there of the supernatural work of the Spirit, in conveying to us the nature of Adam, or in its historical development? And what need is there of his intervention, if the divine-human nature of Christ is the source of all life and even of the resurrection to believers? Or, if we assume that the Spirit by regeneration must insert us in the theanthropic nature of Christ, as our natural birth inserts us in the generic life of the Adam, it is an unnecessary assumption. It lies outside of the system. It is simply a shred of traditional orthodoxy not yet shaken off. The theanthropic life of Christ is propagated by the law of development just as naturally as the life of Adam. "The supernatural," says Dr. Nevin, "has become natural." Exactly so; and therefore it ceases to be supernatural. It is all nature, since the incarnation, just as much as it was before. The blessed Spirit of God, for whose presence, illumination, guidance, sanctifying and consoling power the whole church longs and pants, as a thirsty land for the rain from heaven; whose fellowship with the individual believer and with the whole body of the faithful, is invoked daily and hourly, somewhere in the church, in the apostolic benediction, this blessed Spirit, τὸ ἅγιον καὶ τὸ ζωοποιόν, is in this system reduced to a name. One writer in the *Mercersburg Review* says the

Spirit is the *modus* of Christ's theanthropic nature in the soul. Dr. Nevin says, it is the force of that life. So far as the system is concerned it is nothing. We need say no more. A theory which takes away a present, personal Saviour; which takes away his righteousness; which ignores the blessed Spirit of God; which makes faith a mere consciousness of the divine-human life within us, and represents regeneration as imputation, the feeble principle of life therein implanted being all our interest in the righteousness of Christ, all we have to plead at the bar of conscience or the tribunal of God, is not a doctrine on which a soul can live.

## CORRECTIONS.

Page 124, foot note, for Thomsen, read A. U. Thomsen's *Die Schleiermachersche Philosophische Grundansicht*, page 10.

Page 126, foot note, for "one call," read "one and all."

Page 127, line 9, for her, read the.

lines 11 and 13, for active, read actual.

Page 146, line 17 from bottom, for "transferred," read "transfused."

line 3 do. do. for "as," read "in."